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1. Introduction 
Relations between Germany and Czechia have been developing in a very specific, almost 
reserved manner, despite the fact that the two countries are closely linked. The 
revolutionary year 1989 opened a new chapter in their relations, in which both countries 
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pursued shared European goals: democracy, freedom, a market economy and the 
stabilisation of peace and prosperity in Europe (Gehring, Delinić and Zeller 2010: 34).  
In the early 1990s, Czechia gradually established itself as a leading exponent of 
policy reform aimed at economic expansion and gradual transformation into a democracy 
ready to integrate into European and trans-Atlantic structures. Economic links, and the 
trade and economic benefits that resulted for both partners, became the precursor for 
strong bilateral cooperation between Czechia and Germany. In addition to close economic 
relations, the two partners also developed multiple initiatives, at many levels, including 
the national, non-governmental, regional (including border regions) and local levels, with 
the aim of overcoming historical obstacles and establishing a shared future course in the 
EU. Despite these efforts, largely implemented by German and Czech political leaders, civil 
society in both countries remained reticent in its evaluation of Czech-German bilateral 
cooperation. This reticence was primarily due to mutual indifference and persistent 
prejudices. In Germany, there was a lack of interest in cooperating with the country’s 
eastern neighbours, including Czechia, which was seen as a small country without serious 
issues and without major points in common with Germany. From the point of view of the 
Czech population, meanwhile, the image of Germany continues to be bound by the past; 
the well-known stereotypes persist and since the Czech accession to the EU the perception 
of Germany has concentrated solely on neighbourly relations. There are two main views 
of Czechia in Germany: a more differentiated view in the immediately neighbouring 
federal states of Bavaria and Saxony, and a less differentiated view of Czechia as a former 
state of the Communist Eastern Bloc. Thus, Czechia is seen, on the one hand, by the older 
population through the prism of a Europe divided by the Iron Curtain, and, on the other, 
by younger people in the context of open European borders (Gehring, Delinić and Zeller 
2010: 41–44). 
Czech and German political leaders had shared interests in the integration of 
Czechia into the EU and NATO. It was in Germany’s interest to secure the stability of 
Central European countries, as that would allow for closer and more effective 
collaboration in resolving problems in the Balkans. Integration policy was an 
indispensable part of Germany’s foreign policy. Germany’s support for the Czech 
Republic’s integration into the EU was an important step in achieving reconciliation and 
dealing with the past, as was confirmed by the Czech-German Declaration, signed in 1995. 
Also playing an important role was integration into NATO, supported by Germany not just 
through the Partnership for Peace programme, but also with strong cooperation between 
German and Czech armed forces, undertaken on the basis of a memorandum agreed by 
the defence ministries of the two countries. This collaboration was implemented by direct 
contacts between the armed forces, joint military exercises, training and education 
(Skulínek and Dančák 2016: 21–22). 
In evaluating German-Czech cooperation in the first years after the Czech 
Republic’s independence and German re-unification, as well as subsequently during the 
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accession negotiations for the EU and NATO, and indeed since Czechia’s integration into 
these organisations, multiple experts have described the development of bilateral Czech-
German relations as reserved and ambivalent. The main reasons for such an assessment 
include the lack of preparedness on the part of both states to come to terms with negative 
historical experiences; in Prime Minister Václav Klaus’s deprecatory view of Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl’s vision of European unity and the social dimension of the market economy; 
and in European, or anti-European statements made by certain Czech politicians, which 
indirectly and negatively affected how Czechia was seen by German politicians. At the 
same time, the Christian tradition has played an important role in German political culture 
and its hierarchy of values, while lacking a major position in Czech political culture. On 
the basis of all this, Germany remained reticent in its foreign policy as concerned with 
Czechia, and tended to vacillate opportunistically (Kunštát 1998: 171). 
Multiple authors have argued that Czech-German relations are characterised by 
two factors: (1) the asymmetry of their geopolitical, economic and demographic 
potentials and (2) the overcoming of the shared historical burdens (Fiala and Kadlecová 
2016: 42; Handl 1993; Schulze-Wessel 2004). Stable and peaceful bilateral relations are 
asymmetric if there is clear, long-term, stable disparity between the abilities and 
possibilities of the states, but this disparity does not pose an existential risk for the weaker 
state (Wormack 2015: 13), in this case, Czechia.  
As the weaker state, Czechia should focus on employing soft power in its relations 
with Germany, whose foreign policy is likewise soft-power oriented, in the context of the 
civilian power concept, emphasising multilateralism, multiculturalism, a preference for 
civilian-military operations and post-conflict and reconstruction operations, including 
development policy. At the same time, Germany adopts the role of the ‘model economy’, 
that is, it links the resources of economic prosperity with a high level of economic and 
social security. This role of the model economy was particularly employed to prevent 
general economic stagnation during the oil crisis in the late 1970s, as well as in 2008-
2009 in response to the global financial and economic crisis. In connection with soft 
power, Czechia has focused in its collaboration with Germany on diplomatic resources in 
international organisations at the multilateral and regional levels, and especially sought 
to expand the traditional bilateral framework for relations between states by involving 
non-governmental actors such as civil society, experts and cultural leaders (Fiala and 
Kadlecová 2016: 45). 
On the one hand, in Czech-German cooperation we can identify important 
breakthroughs, achieved either exclusively bilaterally in the area of the economy, in trade 
relations, in cross-border cooperation, and in mutual support for education, culture, 
science and research, innovation and technology; or multilaterally as part of the EU and 
NATO in the domains of defence, security, common market and human-rights protection 
(Gehring, Delinić and Zeller 2010: 44; Fiala and Kadlecová 2016: 41). On the other hand, 
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there are disputed points, stemming from negative facts that manifest themselves, 
likewise, either bilaterally or multilaterally. 
The main aim of this article is therefore to identify the key disputed points in 
German-Czech relations, to analyse the behaviour patterns of both states and 
subsequently to establish whether in these cited problematic areas Germany acted 
according to the model of an ideal civilian power, or whether it used other available means 
to promote its national interests vis-à-vis the Czech Republic. In order to achieve these 
goals, this paper formulates following research questions: 
The main research question:  
1. Is Germany acting as an ideal civilian power in the German-Czech bilateral 
relations? 
 
Partial research questions:  
2. What ate typical characteristics of civilian power behaviour? 
3. What are the main disputed points in German-Czech bilateral relations? 
4. What political strategy did Germany follow in these disputes? In which cases 
does it not correspond with a civilian power? 
5. What other concepts does German political strategy tend to?3  
                                                          
 
3 Alternative concepts to explain German real behaviour in bilateral Czech relations are trade state, middle 
power and servant leader. Trade state is primarily oriented towards the affluence and prosperity of the 
country as a whole and especially its population, and this is prioritised in any foreign-policy disputes. It is 
in a trade state’s interest to resolve any conflict peacefully and to cooperate internationally on creating and 
maintaining peace. According to Michael Staack, the main rationale for such actions and for such a state’s 
interest in peaceful conflict resolution, in cooperation and in balancing the interests of various states 
through multilateral cooperation is the trade state’s awareness that trade and prosperity can be most 
consistently developed in a peaceful international environment, regionally as well as globally, but 
particularly in a world economic system based on liberal values and principles (Staack 2013: 1).  
Regarding middle power concept, many authors agree that a middle power is located between a great power 
and a small state; it has at its disposal certain power, both material and non-material, that is greater than 
that of a small state but smaller than that of a great power. In consequence of this a middle power is unable 
to influence international relations on its own. Its power is insufficient to do that; rather, what is expected 
is that it would be able to establish itself in a regional context, where it could act as a dominant power, 
determining the relations between the actors of the region. The relative power ranking of a state is 
important for the overall conceptualisation of a middle power: such a power adjusts its behaviour to the 
relative balance of power in the system (Gecelovsky 2009; Ungerer 2007; Cooper, Higgot and Nossal 1993; 
Cooper 2013). 
The concept of “servant leadership” was originally developed by American businessman Robert Greenleaf 
in his essay ‘The Servant as Leader’, in which he studied the notion of leadership, especially as concerned 
with business. Later the concept was also applied to other areas, and took on a more comprehensive social 
character (Mangasarian and Techau 2017: 17). The concept is based on the fundamental idea of a leader, 
who is first of all the servant of the people and institute whose needs are first and foremost for the leader; 
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In terms of methodology, the article primarily proceeds on the basis of the Weber’s 
ideal typology. An ideal type is a common mental construct in the social sciences derived 
from observable reality although not conforming to it in detail because of deliberate 
simplification and exaggeration. It is a constructed ideal used to approximate reality by 
selecting certain elements (Weber 1984, 1998). In this context ideal civilian power 
behaviour will be reconstructed in order to analyse in which cases and under which 
conditions real political behaviour of Germany diverse from ideal civilian power 
behaviour.  
 
2. Ideal type of civilian power  
Civilian power represents a foreign policy role concept — as a complex block of norms, 
beliefs, attitudes and perceptions - which determinates behaviour both of a state and its 
decision makers. Civilian power is defined as a state willing to take initiatives and 
influence international and political affairs using specific strategies, means and 
instruments such as civilising of international relations, developing democratic society 
with perfectly civilised politics (Maull 2000: 14).  
Support for democratisation, good governance and the dissemination of 
democratic principles, universal values and sustainable development are to be considered 
as the main characteristics of an ideal civilian power (Kříž and Urbanovská 2014), i.e. 
national interests of such a power are interdependent. Authors Harnisch and Maull 
describe the ideal type of civilian power as an initiator/promoter of multilateral co-
operation, whose principal national aim is welfare maximisation and whose international 
aims are to promote supranational institutionalisation, its deepening and widening as 
well as the further development of international law and its enforcement. The policy style 
derives from collective action, compromise and mediation, preference for institutional 
solutions, as well as partnership and the collective enforcement of international norms 
(Harnisch and Maull 2001). 
The above mentioned characteristic is to be applied also from the military point of 
view. It is in the interests of such a power to cooperate with its partners in the military 
domain, not just regionally or bilaterally, but in particular multilaterally, within 
                                                          
 
this then implies that the leader’s primary aim is not to enlarge its own power and riches. The primary 
interest of the leader, then, is to ensure that the interests of others are met; not in an altruistic sense, but in 
the sense of the leader’s absolute selflessness. By contrast, the servant leader is aware that its own interests 
are best served by supporting the interests and needs of others. Greenleaf argued that it is crucial where 
the leader’s authority comes from, as this authority can only be recognised as long as the leader’s intention 
to serve is truly discernible. This means that the servant leader is first of all a servant and only then a leader 
(Greenleaf 1991). 
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international organisations such as the UN, NATO and the EU. A civilian power is even 
willing to support the increase of its partners’ military capacities in order to maintain 
peace and stability. Military power can only be used in accordance with international law, 
as a measure of last resort, if every possible diplomatic attempt to resolve a conflict has 
proven ineffectual. In terms of the economy, a civilian power supports efficient structures 
and the market economy, and makes use of the benefits created by free trade. Hence it is 
in its interests to seek closer integration, helping to liberalise trade and remove trade 
barriers between partners (Maull 1999; Maull 2000; Kříž 2007; Kříž and Urbanovská 
2014).  
In Maull's view Germany has been representing an ideal type of civilian power 
because its foreign policy behaviour is in accordance with specific civilian power features; 
such as a willingness to take initiatives and assume responsibility for shaping events 
axiomatic multilateralism, support for deepening and widening international institutions, 
the promotion of the rule of law in international affairs and a willingness to transfer 
sovereignty and last but not least a value-based foreign policy which pursues certain 
norms even if its national interest do not benefit from the promotion of these norms 
(Maull 2000: 16–17). 
 
3. The main points of divergence in German-Czech relations 
Despite the fact Germany shall behave as an ideal civilian power in its relations with 
Czechia, several disputed points in their mutual cooperation are identified confirming 
discrepancy with the ideal type of civilian power. 
 Divergences between Germany and the Czech Republic result also from asymmetry 
in power resources and from power distribution, particularly from economic power. 
From the economic point of view the main factors to be compared in their relations are 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), and foreign trade 
(Table 1). 
Regarding GDP as the first factor continual increase of the GDP is visible in 1994–
2018. GDP increase in the Czech Republic was achieved after its integration in the EU 
which guaranteed economic situation improvement. However, there is an obvious 
difference in the GDP development between both states influencing their mutual foreign 
trade. Export and import data show that the Czech Republic is one of the foremost trade 
partners for Germany, in export in the 12th place and in import in the seventh place. For 
the Czech Republic Germany is the most important trade partner both in export and 
import terms, i. e. Germany is in the first place in the Czech foreign trade. These data 
confirm significant economic dependency of the Czech Republic on Germany which can 
lead to potential changes in German political behaviour towards its neighbour utilizing its 
economic potential and thus exerting political and economic pressure on the Czech 
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Republic not only at multilateral level in the decision processes about crucial economic 
EU issues but also at the bilateral level in the identified disputed points of their 
cooperation.  
 
Table 1. Economic indicators 
Indicators / States Germany Czech Republic 
GDP bil. Eur 1994 2206 47 
2010 2819 207 
2017 3677 215 
GCI Index 2004/2005 5.28 – 13. 4.55 – 40. 
2009/2010 5.37 – 7. 4.67 – 31. 
2014/2015 5.49 – 5. 4.53- 37. 
2017-2018 5.7 – 5. 4.8 – 31. 
foreign trade – GE → CZ (2017) export  41.6 bil. € (3.25%) 
import  46.46 bil. € (4.47%) 
foreign trade – CZ → GE (2017) export  53.5 bil. € (32%) 
import  32 bil. € (25.8%) 
Source: GDP (2018a, 2018b), GCR (2013a, 2013b), Schwab et el. (2014: 13), GCI (2019), BWE 
(2019), CZSO (2018). 
 
GCI index, analysing institutions, appropriate infrastructure, stable macroeconomic 
framework, good health and primary education, higher education and training, efficient 
goods markets, efficient labour markets, developed financial markets, ability to harness 
existing technology, market size—both domestic and international, production of new 
and different goods using the most sophisticated production processes and innovation, 
demonstrates differences between Germany and the Czechia which can influence 
comprehensive German image about the Czech Republic and its ability to maintain stable 
economic increase, to guarantee public prosperity and to provide domestic and 
international entrepreneurs proper conditions for development of their business plans. 
These economic disparities can affect German political behaviour towards the Czech 
Republic as it was mentioned above to behave not as an ideal civilian power but rather as 
a trading state pursuing national economic interests and developing economic 
cooperation granting welfare and economic prosperity for Germany.  
The main hot issues in Czech-German cooperation are divided to divergences on 
the one hand at the multilateral European level, including divergent positions towards 
resolving the migration crisis and towards fundamental issues of the functioning of the 
EU. On the other hand, at the bilateral level, i.e. historical question concerned with the 
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expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, and the related problematic negotiations concerned 
with the Czech-German Declaration.  
 
3.1. Multilateral divergences between Czechia and Germany concerning European 
integration 
The successful integration of the Czech Republic into the European Union opened a new 
phase of Czech foreign policy, which has not always been exclusively pro-European, and 
divided Czech political parties into four currents. The first current consisted of the 
“internationalists”: the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party 
(KDU–ČSL), the Green Party and the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), who 
supported closer integration and stronger trans-Atlantic relations. The second current of 
“Europeanists”, present on the left of the political spectrum and represented by members 
of ČSSD and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), prefers closer 
European integration over Euro-Atlantic relations, whereas the third current of the 
“Atlanticists”, represented by some leaders of the Civic Democratic party (ODS) and 
especially by the former prime minister, Václav Klaus, considers Czechia’s relations with 
the USA and UK as an absolute priority and rejects European integration beyond the 
framework of intergovernmental cooperation. The “Atlanticists” have established a 
Eurosceptic, or “Eurorealist”, profile that considers the EU an economic community that 
ought to function on the principle of intergovernmental cooperation between nation-
states. The last, fourth, movement of the ‘autonomists’, led by a conservative wing within 
KSČM, rejects the EU and NATO, arguing that the EU is an instrument of large capitalist 
countries, especially Germany (Handl 2006: 53; Lang 2002). 
This disunity on the Czech political scene has long influenced Czech foreign policy 
on the EU and fundamental European issues, creating several points of dispute between 
Germany and the Czech Republic concerned with the functioning of the EU, the position 
of nation-states, the future direction of the Union and recent issues such as Eurozone 
crisis and migration crisis. 
 
3.1.1. European integration process 
The specificity of bilateral Czech-German relations is two-fold. First, the two countries 
take multiple divergent positions on European issues. Second, on those European issues 
where they share similar positions and find no other allies – for example, in agricultural 
policy – closer cooperation between the two eventually emerges. But in those cases where 
the Czech and German governments present the same position which is shared with other 
important European partners, the bilateral Czech-German aspect of their relations is not 
decisive, or is not the driver of further developments or solution of the issue in question 
(Belling 2016: 80). 
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Considering the disputed points of Czech-German relations in the context of 
European integration, it was the group of “Atlanticists” led by the former Czech prime 
minister and president, Václav Klaus, who proposed the most fundamental critique. Klaus 
presented contradictory positions towards Czech integration into the EU, and to the EU 
project as a whole. On the one hand, he argued that accession had more of a negative effect 
– of the Eurocrats – than a positive one (Handl 2006: 54). On the other, he pointed to the 
advantages stemming from membership in European structures – such as the opening of 
a large political and economic area and the implementation of parts of European law into 
Czech national law – which would improve the quality of Czech judiciary and law, and the 
liberalisation of the economy (Lang 2002: 9).  
The option to participate in the European decision-making process does not play 
an important role for Czechia, Klaus argued, because ultimately it can only achieve what 
Germany will countenance. He considered Europeanism a new, dominant meta-ideology 
of the elites, a conglomeration of ideas that was heterogeneous in character, emphasising 
the model of a welfare state or social-market economy (Klaus 2006). Klaus rejected not 
just the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, but also the overall development of 
the European Union since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. According to Klaus, it 
was desirable to adopt such a European Constitution that would strengthen the powers 
of nation-states, and the EU would act as a free association of European states. The 
autonomists, too, took a similar stance, promoting Czech interests in the EU; while the 
“internationalists” and “Europeanist” did not see the EU as an ordinary economic 
organisation, but as one that is significantly invested in its values, and within the 
framework of which the member states have equal opportunity to participate on political 
economic and social affairs. As the various currents differed in how they saw European 
integration, their stances towards Germany’s European policy were equally varied. The 
ODS believed that Germany’s aim was the “artificial” centralisation of the EU. All Czech 
political parties agreed that it was in Germany’s interests to support eastern EU 
enlargement and to support Central and Eastern European countries in the pre-accession 
negotiations (Handl 2006: 54). 
Despite this, there have been cases where Germany has pursued purely its national 
interests, as in the introduction of a temporary period during which the citizens of new 
member states were excluded from the German labour market, and also in agricultural 
policy. As for the former, it needs noting that despite Czech criticisms and appeals to the 
German government to open the German labour market, ultimately the Czech labour force 
did not show much interest in working in Germany, and hence the question did not play a 
significant role in the bilateral German-Czech relations (Belling 2016: 81). Generally 
speaking Germany's foreign policy is pro-European focused on intensive and effective 
cooperation with all EU members in significant areas in order to develop common policies 
and achieve common and sustainable goals in the EU integration issues (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2016).  
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The two countries’ different positions were apparent during the negotiations of 
and subsequent voting on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The Czech 
government not only presented its priorities, different from those of the German 
government, but also sought to win support for small- and medium-sized EU members, 
with the aim of creating a counterpoise to the large countries led by Germany. Czech 
political leaders considered German actions during the negotiations on the constitution 
as an attempt to assume a leading role in Europe (Handl 2006: 55). The Czech Republic 
also saw the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty, including the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, as problematic. The country made its approval of the Lisbon 
Treaty conditional on obtaining an opt-out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
This Czech position was received in Germany with displeasure, and led to stagnation in 
mutual relations. The Czech Republic justified its rejection of the Charter by citing 
concerns that the Court of Justice of the European Union could legitimise the property 
claims made by Sudeten Germans against the Czech Republic. Thus, this argument 
brought back an unresolved issue of the past. Although German politicians were able to 
distinguish between the rhetoric and the positions of the Czech government (which was 
pro-European) on the one hand and the Czech president (the Eurosceptic Klaus) on the 
other, in the German media the Czech position was depicted as one, and presented a single 
image of the Czech Republic as an Eurosceptic ally of the United Kingdom and Poland 
(Belling 2016: 85–86). 
The different conceptions have nonetheless never led the Czech side to a direct 
confrontation with Germany, as they have been aware of the potential threats to 
cooperation in the key policy areas which are of eminent importance to Czechia. Since the 
Czech Republic lacks a medium-term policy strategy on Europe, fundamental issues of 
European integration are not discussed by Czech and German political leaders. This 
means that where interests diverge, the closeness of cooperation between Czechia and 
Germany in the EU depends on whether the issue in question is part of their bilateral 
agenda. Whereas in areas such as environmental, social and labour policies there is strong 
bilateral cooperation, in defence, foreign and industrial policies there is not (Handl 2006: 
56–57). 
A common European foreign policy is the most problematic and polarising issue, 
not just for Czech-German relations but also for the whole Czech political spectrum. Czech 
“Atlanticists” rejected the creation of a European foreign affairs minister and European 
External Action Service (diplomatic service), as they thought these could ultimately 
weaken the nation-states. Since the aim of the “Atlanticists” is to support strong NATO 
cooperation, they are against joint European armed forces, which might replace the 
integrated NATO units. The “autonomists”, by contrast, would prefer to abolish NATO; yet 
they also oppose the European defence policy, which might lead to a restriction of NATO 
activities, or even replace the pact. According to the autonomists, a stronger EU would act 
as a counterbalance to US influence. In 2002–2006, during the Convention on the Future 
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of Europe, they supported the creation of a European foreign affairs minister post and 
preferred an EU ready for action to a powerful NATO. In the Czech Republic, there has 
been a divergence not just among the various currents as outlined above, but also 
between the crucial ministries, defence and foreign affairs. The Czech defence ministry 
took an “Atlanticist” position, oriented towards strong cooperation in NATO, while the 
European section at the foreign affairs ministry saw Germany as the crucial partner in 
Europe and supported cooperation in the EU and the inner group of Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France (Handl 2006: 61). The German defence ministry has long adopted a 
similar posture, promoting the creation of a European defence union in terms of an "army 
of Europeans" (Weissbuch 2016). 
Discussing common European defence, former Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav 
Sobotka proclaimed that EU leaders were obliged to guarantee the security of European 
citizens. He also suggested that joint European armed forces might be created, and that 
they would ensure that the interests of European states would be protected. These 
European forces would not compete with NATO, but provide a more reliable partner for 
collaboration with NATO, one that would be more ready for action than before (Sobotka 
2016). Sobotka’s position on common European defence – armed forces included – was 
shared by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, despite the fact that both 
politicians previously rejected any defence and security projects in the EU that would 
diminish the role of NATO in Europe. Experts evaluate their changed position as, on the 
one hand, a consequence of Brexit, which will transform security and defence cooperation 
in the EU, and as a consequence of the criticism to which Central European countries have 
been subjected over their refusal to accept refugees and failure to show sufficient 
solidarity in resolving the refugee crisis (Denková et al. 2016). Current Czech government 
declares that it is in the Czech interest to promote integration process, European cohesion 
and effective cooperation of all EU members in order to prevent increasing power of anti-
European and anti-system political parties, however position of national states have to 
remain strong as well (Programové prohlášení vlády 2018). 
Analysis of the first Czech – German divergence shows that Germany does not act 
as an ideal civilian power towards states that criticise or keep their distance from 
common European solutions. As a civilian power, focused on laissez-faire idea, free trade 
benefits, trade development with the Central European states, Germany should appeal on 
all EU states to be actively engaged in deepening and widening of the EU integration 
process, not only in economic and monetary policy, but also in institutional affairs and 
within common foreign and defence policy as well. Germany’s primary aim is to safeguard 
the institutional and contractual pillars of European integration, including potential 
closer union, its stability and prosperous development. It is in Germany’s interest to 
maintain a stable European Union, one that is ready to act globally, and united in the 
fundamental questions and directions. Czechia, supported by some other EU members, 
argues that European integration project is in reality a German project and Germany is 
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the only state taking advantage from EU integration both economically and politically. In 
this regard Germany tends to act in a role of a global actor or in Münkler's argumentation 
a role of a power in the middle, i.e. “Mittelmacht” (Record of interview 1; Münkler 2015) 
rather than in a role of an ideal civilian power.  
 
3.1.2. Migration crisis 
The migration crisis is another point of dispute between Czechia and Germany (Germany 
also disagrees with Poland, Slovakia and Hungary on this issue). Like its other Central 
European counterparts, the Czech government claims that it is interested in promoting 
the principle of “effective solidarity”, based on a readiness to participate in preparing 
strategies for effective and integrated development cooperation with countries of 
migration origin and transit, and consequently granting development and humanitarian 
aid to these countries. At the same time, they declare their readiness to improve the 
efficiency of bilateral and EU assistance for groups at risk in countries and regions 
threatened by conflict (Visegrad Group 2015). The primary areas of their engagement are 
the Balkan countries, protection of EU external borders, support for continuous and close 
dialogue with Turkey, and improving the efficiency of FRONTEX (Record of interview 2 
2018).  
In the official meetings of their political representatives at the highest level, the 
Czech and German sides have not been able to present a united position and both partners 
confirmed official statements of their countries. German president Steinmeier appealed 
to his Czech counterpart Zeman to the effect that all EU member states need to be aware 
of their commitment to respect the decisions of the European Court of Justice and of the 
commitment to solidarity not just with refugees, but also with their other European 
partners, who bear the brunt of the refugees (Steinmeier 2017). President Zeman, by 
contrast, argued that the Czech political scene was united on the issue of the refugees, and 
that aid was provided by other ways than by accepting refugees, namely in aid to 
construct power plants, hospitals, schools and drinking water supplies in the countries 
the refugees leave (Zeman 2017). Moreover, German Chancellor Merkel is convinced her 
decision to open Germany’s doors to refugees in 2015 was right and humane and it was a 
reaction to an emergency situation (Bundeskanzlerin 2016). She argued that compulsory 
quotas present fair solution how to face with refugees as this crisis is to be solved as a 
common problem and jointly not as a problem of particular EU states (of south European 
states the most threatened or of Germany) (Bundeskanzlerin 2015).  
Germany's behaviour in case of migration crisis does not confirm behaviour of an 
ideal civilian power. Rather the opposite: many experts and public opinion agree that 
Germany’s soft power has failed, that the civilian power concept is not applicable (Record 
of interview 2 2018). In resolving the refugee crisis in particular, Germany acts as a middle 
power, as shown by its ambitions to push through a “willkommen” policy and compulsory 
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quotas at the European level. This German behaviour can be seen as a manifestation of 
unilateralism which diverse from civilian power concept. Some other experts argue that 
German behaviour is in accordance with a servant leader concept. German proposal to 
solve migration crisis presented a common European solution focused on more effective 
borders' control, burden sharing related to refugees accepting within the whole EU, 
common asylum policy, on the interest to fight against migration crisis reasons. Moreover, 
Germany showed its readiness to implement these goals, to serve as an example for other 
partners and not to be in a position of a leader. As a servant leader Germany does not 
serve its partners, but also demands cooperation from them, particularly it demands 
solidarity from the Central European states by implementing common refugee crisis 
solution (Mangasarian-Techau 2017). 
 
3.1.3. Eurozone crisis 
Under the influence of the Eurozone crisis, there has been an increase in Euroscepticism 
among the Czechs, with growing mistrust not just of the euro but the EU as well. This 
Euroscepticism could have led to a dangerous scenario, should the Civic Democratic Party 
have scored another success after the 2010 elections. The party might have turned against 
the EU, and turned Euroscepticism into its ideological political programme. Such a 
scenario would have led to a change in how the Czech public and its political leaders act 
vis-à-vis the EU, and to a gradual marginalisation of Czechia in European integration 
(Handl 2012). The main differences between Germany and Czechia are notable directly in 
the question of the euro.  
The Czech Republic does not show much willingness to adopt the common 
European currency, finding support in other EU members who have an opt-out from the 
Eurozone, such as the United Kingdom and Denmark. This means that the Czech Republic 
is not obliged to take part in Eurozone measures promoted by Germany, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) or the European Commission. The decision not to join the Eurozone 
might spell risks for the Czech Republic, in the sense that the decision-making 
mechanisms in the Eurozone are being strengthened, and the position of non-members 
weakened (Handl 2012). 
In the Czech Republic, there has long been a problem of political disunity, not only 
across the political spectrum at large but also within the executive. During the 
government led by Prime Minister Petr Nečas, there were differences of opinion as to how 
the Eurozone crisis ought to be resolved, between Prime Minister Nečas, the foreign 
affairs minister, Karel Schwarzenberg, and the country’s president, Klaus. The ODS, led by 
Nečas and Klaus, promoted a policy of isolating Czechia from the Eurozone, its legal 
instruments, the institutional aspects of integration and efforts at ever-closer union. Both 
politicians criticised the measures to increase the means of the International Monetary 
Fund, while the leaders of the coalition partner TOP09, and the opposition party ČSSD, 
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argued that the Czech Republic could not reject the EU plan to aid the Eurozone. The ODS 
also refused to participate in the Fiscal Compact. President Klaus said in this respect that 
the Eurozone was on course to fiscal and political union, or a federation, and that this was 
unacceptable to the ODS. Such developments, Klaus argued, would substantially increase 
economic costs, and would lead to negative economic and political developments in the 
Czech Republic. In consequence of this, the argument went, it was in the Czech Republic’s 
interests to isolate itself politically and institutionally from the Eurozone and its 
problems, including such measures as the European Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal 
Compact, the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Banking Union, promoted precisely 
by Germany. TOP 09, by contrast, defended Czech participation in the Fiscal Compact 
(Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky 2011; Beneš and Braun 2012). These 
domestic political disputes created a negative image of the country abroad, potentially 
threatening Czechia’s relations with key European partners, Germany included. For this 
reason, Prime Minister Nečas assured Chancellor Merkel that the Czech Republic was 
aware of its obligations towards the EU, was interested in the stability of the euro, and 
would therefore act as a “shadow sigNATOry” of the Fiscal Compact, with the option of 
joining the Compact in the future (Nečas 2011; Spiegel 2012). 
Despite this, the role played by Germany in resolving the Eurozone crisis was not 
seen positively by Czech politicians. Czech Eurosceptics led by President Klaus accused 
Germany of hegemony and diktat, from an attempt peacefully to obtain clear European 
dominance, attempting to convert the EU into a “Fourth Reich” (Handl 2012). The ODS 
therefore emphasised the principle of intergovernmental cooperation in the EU, with a 
strong position for the nation states, hoping to eliminate the European initiatives pushed 
by the German-French tandem. Germany rejected such criticism; it did not match the 
profile of a hegemon, but rather took the role of a careful and reluctant actor, whose 
primary aim was to create an efficient strategy for saving and stabilising the euro. These 
were impossible without political instruments, such as the fiscal union and the ECB’s 
bond-buying programme (Handl 2012). 
On the issue of the Eurozone crisis, the German position was very specific, in that 
the country sought to act not as a leader, or a hegemon in resolving the crisis, but as a 
country aware of its economic might and influence in introducing measures to resolve the 
crisis (Hacker 2012: 14). To Germany it was important to find partners able to follow its 
proposals how to face the Eurozone crisis. The main proposals involved decrease of state 
expenses, social expenses, and enterprise subventions and set up of austerity mechanism. 
All this had to be accepted by all EU members not only by those of the Eurozone (Hock-
Feig 2012). Chancellor Merkel had a keen interest in keeping the euro afloat, not just in 
the context of upholding the economic stability of the EU as a whole, but above all in the 
context of Germany’s own economic interests and its export-oriented economy 
(Bundeskanzlerin 2013). Germany was willing to provide financial means to save Greece 
and the euro and to set up austerity mechanisms that EU member states had to adhere to 
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in order to save the euro, with the aim of maintaining a long-term balance in the Eurozone 
(Mangasarian and Techau 2017: 61–62). For that reason, Germany behaved as a “servant 
leader”.  
 
3.2. Bilateral divergences - the legal groundwork of German-Czech cooperation and 
dealing with negative historical experience 
In the first years after German reunification and the end of the ideological conflict 
between the East and the West, there followed an era of reserved and relatively cool 
bilateral relations, due to the promotion of traditional national interests in a “realpolitik” 
sense, such as the minority issue or language policy (Pradetto and Alamir 1997: 54). 
Historical questions, connected with the issue of the expulsion of Sudeten Germans, came 
to the fore of relations most strongly. Despite the fact that this bilateral issue does not 
represent the core divergence in current Czech-German relations, its impact on complex 
Czech-German cooperation is obvious. Furthermore in this issue diversion from the 
civilian power behaviour is to be expected.  
This issue and the discussion about the fundamental bilateral treaties between the 
Czech Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, namely the Treaty between the 
Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany of Good 
Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation, and the German-Czech Declaration on Mutual 
Relations and their Future Development, presented the main point of contention in 
bilateral cooperation between Germany and Czechia. 
The 1992 German-Czech Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation treaty is 
the fundamental agreement that dealt with a broad spectrum of neighbourly issues, 
including recognition of territorial integrity and the setting of borders (Gehring, Delinić 
and Zeller 2010: 35), excluded any territorial demands, confirmed that the 1938 Munich 
Agreement was null and void and defined the rights of national minorities (Dauderstädt 
2007: 427), but did not provide specific positions on the negative experiences of the past, 
reparations for the victims of the Nazi regime, or the question of the expulsion of Sudeten 
Germans from Czechoslovakia. Since contradictory issues of property compensation for 
Czechs and the expulsion of Sudeten Germans were insufficiently clarified, more 
fundamental steps had to be taken towards their resolution. However, in the mid-1990s 
in politics and in society in both countries, there were tense and acrimonious discussions 
between political leaders, representatives of the Sudeten Germans and the population. 
From 1989, the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft demanded that the Beneš decrees be 
abolished and the expelled Sudeten Germans be given the right to a homeland. On the one 
hand, it derived moral and political support from the position taken by President Havel, 
who in 1989 for the first time in a personal proclamation apologised to the Sudeten 
Germans for the expulsion, for which he was criticised by Czech politicians and citizens. 
On the other hand, the Landsmannschaft gained strong political support from the 
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Bavarian CSU (Christian Social Union), which together with its sister party CDU (Christian 
Democratic Union) defended the interests of the Sudeten Germans in the Bundestag, and 
this had implications for the subsequent negotiations of the German-Czech Declaration. 
The pressures exerted by the CSU, as well as by the Sudeten Germans, on Chancellor Kohl 
mounted, in consequence of which the chancellor withdrew his proposal to compensate 
the Czech victims of Nazism. The situation became so tense that the Sudeten German 
associations demanded that legal steps be taken in cases where what had originally been 
property of Sudeten Germans was auctioned; they also wanted to have the expulsion 
recognised as an unlawful act and the Beneš decrees abolished.4 At the same time, the CSU 
demanded that the Czech side recognise the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft as an 
equal partner in the negotiations of the German-Czech Declaration. The Czech side 
refused, arguing that the only partner for negotiations was the federal government. 
Despite his rigid stance, the Bavarian prime minister Edmund Stoiber eventually joined 
the negotiations of the final declaration of the German-Czech Declaration on Mutual 
Relations and their Future Development, which was signed on 21 January 1997 by Prime 
Minister Klaus and Chancellor Kohl (Valenta 2017: 33–36). 
The primary aim of the German-Czech Declaration was to strengthen bilateral 
cooperation and clearly to formulate regret of the occupation and subsequent devastation 
of Czechoslovakia, as well as of the post-war expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. Although 
the Declaration was a successful development in Czech-German relations, it needs noting 
that Chancellor Kohl was unable fully to pursue its aims in the Bundestag or indeed in 
German society broadly, in consequence of his claim that “despite the Declaration, certain 
matters remain open”, creating disappointment among the Czechs. The opportunity to 
deal with the past consistently was not taken up by either the Czech or the German side 
(Cordell and Wolff 2005: 157). 
It is true that while negotiating the German-Czech Declaration, the two sides 
claimed to have a shared goal: that is, to jettison the burden of the past, and declared a 
political aim not to return to this past, yet their starting positions were different. The 
German side was not ready for the expected legal and political termination of the dispute 
without the Czech side showing a willingness to reflect upon the events connected with 
the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia. The more explicitly the Czech reflection 
                                                          
 
4 The Beneš decrees are a set of 143 acts adopted by Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš in 1940 and 
1945, concerned with the restoration of Czechoslovak borders as they were before the Munich Agreement, 
confiscation of property and punishment of collaborationists with the Nazis of Hungarian and German 
nationality, the creation of special courts of law, the revocation of Czechoslovak citizenship of those people 
who during the period when the country had been under occupation claimed Hungarian or German 
nationality, and last but not least the expulsion of people of Hungarian and German national minorities 
(Ruttkayová 2007). 
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and self-criticism was expressed, the more concrete and politically serious the legal and 
political termination of the issue became. In Article IV of the Declaration, the two 
countries agreed not to encumber their relations with the political and legal questions of 
the past, but to remain tied by their legal systems and respect the different views of each 
other. The Czech side relied precisely on this article, whereas the German side relativized 
it. Under the influence of the negotiations of the Declaration, Germany came to “admit its 
guilt” and officially noted a causal nexus between the events of 1938–1939 and 1945–
1946. In consequence of this step, there was a major critical self-reflection on the Czech 
side concerned with the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, a reflection that was 
acceptable across the German political spectrum. Despite this, Czechia did not 
unambiguously declare the expulsion a lawless act, creating resentment among the 
Sudeten Germans. This increased intra-coalition pressures on Chancellor Kohl, who had 
the final decision about the character of the German-Czech Declaration and also about the 
resolution of this contradictory aspect of historical German-Czech relations. Chancellor 
Kohl monopolised the issue, limited the mandate given to the main negotiators – State 
Secretary Peter Hartmann and Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel – and planned to 
exert his veto, creating concern among both politicians and civil society as to whether the 
chancellor’s actions were constitutional. In this context, President Weizsäcker questioned 
the democratic means which Chancellor Kohl used with respect to the Sudeten German 
question in Czech-German relations (Kunštát 1998: 168). 
The Sudeten German question and the issue of the Beneš decrees were also 
addressed in the late 1990s by other leading Czech and German politicians. Miloš Zeman, 
the Czech prime minister at the time, declared that the Beneš decrees had expired. At the 
same time, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared that his government would support no 
property claims against the Czechs. These proclamations helped to ease previous political 
tensions between the two partner countries, especially as concerned with the Sudeten 
German question; however, due to the political campaign predominantly waged by 
Bavarian politicians, who continued to focus on questions of the past, these issues 
remained a latent problem in German-Czech relations in subsequent years. In theory, they 
could have constituted risk factors for the beginning of pre-accession negotiations 
between Czechia and the EU, if the Sudeten Germans were to restate their claims 
(Dauderstädt 2007: 427). Until 2010, Bavaria distanced itself from the German-Czech 
Declaration that had been adopted. In 2000 and 2003, CSU members of the European 
Parliament even voted against the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU (Valenta 
2017: 44). 
Fundamental to these issues is the question of reconciliation, which influences the 
measure of relations and friendship between the two nations. The majority of the Czech 
and German populations, which survived the war and its consequences, is unable, despite 
efforts, to accept definitive reconciliation and develop a balanced view of the past. It is 
inevitable that both sides understand and accept the different perspectives on their 
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shared past. But, for Germany, Czech-German relations are not the main priority of 
German foreign policy, in consequence of which it is not the primary aim of the federal 
government to fully deal with the past and to close the divergent issues of the expulsion 
of Sudeten Germans and reparations for Czechs for the period of World War II (Cordell 
and Wolff 2005: 164–165). 
Despite the efforts of multiple diplomatic activities at various levels, and the close 
dialogue within academia and civil society, it is evident that in the Czech Republic this 
topic can be used for political mobilisation (Fiala and Kadlecová 2016: 51). However, most 
experts agree that current Czech-German relations are encumbered not so much by the 
past, as by the present and the future, and that this is due to the two countries’ divergent 
positions on the refugee crisis and future developments in European integration (Pavlíček 
2017: 32). 
Evaluating Germany’s actions towards the Czech Republic as concerned with these 
issues, I come to the conclusion that during the negotiations of the German-Czech 
Declaration, which was to serve as a fundamental document for dealing with the negative 
historical experience, Germany did not behave as an ideal civilian power. This statement 
is supported by the actions of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. On the one hand, he supported the 
final wording of the Declaration, and said alongside his Czech colleague that the questions 
of the past would not encumber the positively developing bilateral relations between the 
two countries. On the other, he was unable to withstand the domestic political and 
especially intra-coalition pressures exerted by the CSU and the Sudetendeutsche 
Landsmannschaft supported by the party, who appealed the abolition of the Beneš 
decrees. In consequence of the prevailing pressure and despite the signing of the 
Declaration, Kohl proclaimed that the questions of the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans 
and dealing with the past were not over. At the same time, during the negotiations 
themselves he was willing to exercise his veto over the final wording of the Declaration, 
as well as to circumscribe the powers of the foreign affairs minister and the state 
secretary. These steps do not correspond with the behaviour of a civilian power, which 
emphasises the principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law, but rather 
to the actions of a state which at the time of its reunification and the renewal of its position 
of power in Europe was primarily pursuing its own national interests. 
  
Conclusion 
The main points of dispute between Germany and the Czech Republic appeared on two 
levels. The first is the multilateral level in the EU, where there are fundamental 
discrepancies between the positions of the Czech and German governments. The second 
is the exclusively bilateral level, connected with the conclusion of the Czech-German 
Declaration.  
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With the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union, the character of 
Czech-German relations changed, in consequence of their incorporation into the 
multilateral framework of supranational organisations. Within this supranational 
community, bilateral relations between states play an important role, particularly in those 
areas where the role of the state as an actor of the supranational decision-making process 
has been strengthened. In the European context, one may note that the relationship 
between Czechia and Germany are seen as close, particularly by the Czechs, and this 
closeness is dependent on the geographical, historical and cultural proximity between the 
two countries and their economic links (Belling 2016: 102).  
Although the Czech Republic is aware of the importance of its relationship with 
Germany, in their bilateral relations several points of dispute have appeared that are 
linked with the evolution of the EU, specifically with its institutional aspects, the 
resolution of the Eurozone crisis, and the still ongoing migration crisis. These points of 
dispute have led to stagnation in the relations between Czechia and Germany. Not just the 
differences of opinion between Czech and German politics, but also domestic political 
disunity, prevailing in Czechia between Prime Minister Nečas government members – 
especially TOP09 politicians – and President Klaus, were problematic. The Eurosceptic 
pronouncements made by President Klaus led to a decrease in Germany’s interest in 
making an effort to convince Czech political leaders about the correct and appropriate 
decisions, for instance as concerned with resolving the Eurozone crisis, the adoption of 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which the Czech Republic rejected. Nečas’s government implemented a foreign 
policy focused on economic cooperation, institutional opt-outs from participation in 
certain measures or treaties, and an “à la carte Europe” strategy. The change in Czech 
foreign-policy orientation only came with the rise of the social democratic party led to 
power by Prime Minister Sobotka, who represented a pro-European course, aiming to 
become part of the mainstream of European integration, despite the fact that Czechia was 
not a member of the Eurozone (Handl 2013: 8). 
Such a scenario could be observed in the case of Czechia, which at the beginning 
rejected the austerity measures pushed by the German government. Germany did not see 
Czechia as an essential, or even significant, partner on the support of which Germany’s 
ability to ensure a successful implementation of its strategy for resolving the crisis would 
depend. The decisions were adopted despite the Czech criticisms, and this ultimately led 
to a change in the Czech positions. In the end, the Czech conservative government 
supported Germany’s strict austerity measures within the framework of EU fiscal 
coordination, and on common banking supervision over the EU budget (Belling 2016: 
103). Regarding migration crisis as one important multilateral divergence in Czech-
German relations German behaviour does not correspond with ideal type of civilian 
power. Although civilian power behaviour was applied towards refugees in terms of their 
human rights protection, towards the Czech Republic and other EU members Germany 
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pursued unilateral decisions, such as to open European borders or to set up compulsory 
quotas. As a consequence German behaviour tended to behaviour of a middle power or 
servant leader.  
The above analysis of the disputed point of the questions of the past linked with 
the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from the then-Czechoslovakia, and with 
reparations for Czech victims of the Nazi regime, leads me to note that historical issues 
remain an open problem in bilateral Czech-German relations. This is despite the fact that 
the German-Czech Declaration was concluded in 1995, and serves as a compromise 
solution; and despite the statements made by multiple leading political experts on both 
sides to the effect that bilateral Czech-German cooperation was not encumbered by the 
past.  
As Gniazdowski (2004: 202) argues, issues of the past remain in the background of 
Czech-German relations, determining them to some extent. Political leaders on both sides 
are reluctant to reopen the contradictory questions of the past and are particularly 
interested in finding areas for bilateral cooperation, as well as collaboration at the 
European level, with the aim of avoiding confrontation, stagnation or negative 
developments in the relations from which both sides derive a profit. Despite all this, the 
inability and unwillingness of previous Czech and German governments finally to resolve 
the issue of military reparations, the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans or the 
compensation of Czech victims of Nazism, opens an opportunity for extremists groups in 
both German and Czech societies, which are able to engage politically via forceful 
propagandist campaigns aimed at undecided and unsatisfied voters, influencing public 
opinion and hence election results, at the regional, national and European levels.  
Based on this analysis of the disputed points in German-Czech bilateral 
collaboration, it can be concluded that Germany’s actions towards Czechia diverse in 
some aspects from the behaviour of an ideal civilian power. Germany is aware of its power 
– especially its soft power – which it can exercise vis-à-vis the medium and small countries 
of Central Europe, including the Czech Republic. For that reason, as it was mentioned, 
German actions can be characterised as the behaviour of a trade state (during the 
Eurozone crisis), a middle power (as concerned with questions of the past) or a “servant 
leader” (during the Eurozone and refugee crises). In this, the primary national interests 
come to the fore, not just bilaterally but also multilaterally, as part of which the 
fundamental European issues are resolved.  
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